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REVERSING REFORM: THE HANDSCHU
SETTLEMENT IN POST-SEPTEMBER 11
NEW YORK CITY
Jerrold L. Steigman*
Tappin’ my phone, they never leave me alone
I’m even lethal when I’m unarmed
‘Cause I’m louder than a bomb
—Public Enemy1
INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, messages from the government
and mainstream press have been full of reminders that the world
has changed.2 Mass hysteria has affected markets, government
and society. The United States government rushed through
legislation aimed at deterring further terrorist attacks and
protecting the country, and rounded up suspects based on
ethnicity. The words “September 11” became synonymous with
somber reflection and demanded an etiquette that instantly
developed. A satirical newspaper wondered if irony was dead.3

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.S., B.A., Binghamton
University, 1996.
1
Public Enemy, Louder Than a Bomb, on IT TAKES A NATION OF
MILLIONS TO HOLD US BACK (DefJam Recordings 1988).
2
David Cole, National Security State, THE NATION, Dec. 17, 2001, at 4
(“It is already a cliche that the attacks of September 11 ‘changed
everything.’”).
3
Report: Gen X Irony, Cynicism May be Permanently Obsolete, THE
ONION, Sept. 26, 2001, at 2.
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Reference to September 11 by government officials became proof
enough that the relationship between people and government must
change, the only question remaining being, by how much?
Questioning the prudence or necessity of policies proposing to
radically alter the powers of government was dismissed as
unpatriotic or helpful to terrorists. People’s fears were
commodified and manipulated. Against this backdrop, the rules
governing police investigations of political activists in New York
City came under attack.
The consent decree in Handschu v. Special Services Division,
which included what is referred to as the Handschu Settlement
and which was agreed to in 1985 by New York City residents
and the New York City Police Department (NYPD), governs
police investigations of groups or individuals that engage in
various forms of political activity.4 In September 2002, the
NYPD and the City of New York—defendants in the Handschu
case—sought and obtained modification of the consent decree.5
This note focuses on the mechanics of the Handschu
Settlement and the arguments for and against modification. Part I
summarizes the law regarding modification of consent decrees.
Part II reviews the consent decree entered into in Handschu,6 the

4

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff’d, 787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986). See Tom Perrotta, Police Ask Court to
View Secret Papers, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 1 (reporting that “Handschu”
is Barbara Handschu, an attorney from Buffalo, N.Y., the first named plaintiff
in this class action).
5
Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Modify the Consent Decree
Presently In Effect in this Action [hereinafter Defs.’ Mem. of Law], Handschu
v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kevin Flynn &
Jacob H. Fries, Police Ask to Change the Rules and Ease Restrictions on
Political Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A18.
6
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384. See Paul Chevigny, Politics and Law in
the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1984)
(discussing the settlement agreement, which at that time still was not finalized
or entered as an order in the court). Professor Chevigny was lead counsel for
the plaintiffs in the Handschu case, and his discussion reviewed public and
judicial reactions to local police surveillance in cities and states around the
country. Id. at 738-39. See also Eric Lardiere, Comment, The Justiciability
and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 U.C.L.A. L.
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background of the decree, relevant terms of the decree and
subsequent litigation. Part II also describes the modifications
sought by the defendants as well as the court’s decision to modify
the decree.7 Part III analyzes the defendants’ motion and the
district court decision, illustrating possible results of modification
by considering the outcome of a similar case.8 Part III discusses
whether the defendants’ assertion that the threat of terrorism
required modification of the decree is supportable. The note
concludes by arguing that contrary to the assessment that
terrorism required modification, circumstances have not changed
with respect to the facts or the law in a way that warrants
modification.9 The city we currently live in might be different
than before September 11 because of the supposed newly
discovered realization that the city is vulnerable to attack.10 The
NYPD legitimately wants to prevent possible future terrorist
attacks. But one thing is certain: before the Handschu plaintiffs
obtained the consent decree with the NYPD, the NYPD abused
constitutional rights when it conducted investigations based on
individuals’ protected speech and political affiliations. The police
targeted critics of the government and social justice activists
because of what they thought. The decree helped to curb that
abuse, at least creating a deterrent to abuse and a mechanism for
people to learn of and put a halt to unfair and unfounded
REV. 976 (1983) (exploring government surveillance of political activity and
considering the manner in which citizens can sue to enjoin the government
from conducting these activities).
7
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003).
8
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.
2001) (modifying a similar consent decree for reasons that are posited by the
NYC defendants in Handschu). See infra Part III.C.
9
See infra Part III (arguing that modification is not warranted because the
NYPD gives no persuasive argument for reinstating unchecked monitoring of
political actors).
10
The words “vulnerable to attack” are used with caution. For an
explication of recent trends in speech about war, citizenship and enemies, see
Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies: The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1575, 1586-90 (2002) (commenting that recent political developments
have tended to return racist and marginalizing thinking to common usage).
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investigations. Nothing about terrorism or September 11 changed
the necessity for oversight of police action in this regard. It is
certainly a stressful time in our history. New York City residents
should be skeptical of government enthusiasm for eliminating
oversight in these stressful times. Indeed, the current state of
affairs may actually increase the need for oversight. Without the
decree in place, a known risk is created—the risk that police
abuses will occur and go unrelieved in the absence of oversight.
I. CONSENT DECREES: PURPOSE, POLICY, ENFORCEMENT AND
MODIFICATION
Consent decrees, or consent orders, are settlement
agreements between litigants and have the same force as court
orders.11 When a court approves a decree, it “places its
imprimatur upon a solemn compact between the parties,”
committing “the full power of the judiciary to implement
effectively the obligations undertaken in the decree.”12
Commentators note that consent decrees are not a radical
concept; rather, they are a creative way to use the courts to
obtain justice not forthcoming elsewhere.13

11

Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural
Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725 (1986) (defining a consent
decree as “an agreement of the parties in settlement of litigation . . . which the
court approves and embodies in an order”).
12
Id. at 726.
13
See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazall, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980)
(arguing that institutional reform litigation is not as radical a concept as other
critics have noted and that the biggest changes that such litigation brings are
new entitlements); see also Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational
Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265
(1983) (pointing out that federal judges are in a very difficult position when
presiding over decrees, given their lack of expertise and inability to be
effective managers, but not concluding that structural injunctions should not be
pursued); Margo Schlanger, The Courts: Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional
Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994 (1999) (arguing that
concentration on the federal judge when considering institutional reform
litigation impoverishes the debate on reform, as many other factors put
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A. Reform Litigation and Consent Decrees
The earliest cases that created the foundation for reform
litigation were school desegregation cases,14 but later cases have
included a wide range of public entities.15 Parties have used
consent decrees to enforce the constitutional and statutory rights
and freedoms of citizens facing all types of government actions
and intrusions.16 Consent decrees are most controversial when the

pressure on any area of social movement).
14
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (establishing that
courts, in order to facilitate the desegregation process, demand in their orders
more stringent requirements than might have been available had the case been
fully litigated and not ended in a settlement); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (requiring a unitary school system under a
district court-approved desegregation plan and reiterating approval of broad
federal equitable power where local authority defaults on its obligations).
15
See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (discussing
aspects of contempt actions brought to enforce consent order in Yonkers, a
community particularly reluctant to obey the strictures of the twenty-year-old
agreement between citizens and the local government that required an end to
discriminatory public housing administration); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149 (1987) (ordering one-for-one black state trooper hiring regime on
Alabama Department of Public Safety due to its years of recalcitrance in the
hiring or promotion of blacks); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288
F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding agreement between the federal
government and Los Angeles to discontinue practice of depriving individuals
of constitutional rights “through the use of excessive force, false arrests and
improper searches and seizures”); Labor/Community Strategy Center v. L.A.
County Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding an
agreement between bus riders and city authority to end discriminatory practice
in providing bus services); Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 1998)
(issuing an order to establish satisfactory educational programs and allow
inmates access to courts); Juan F. v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1994)
(upholding an agreement between neglected or abandoned children and the
State of Connecticut to fix the constitutionally-violative administration of child
welfare); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding an
injunction against intolerable prison conditions in Indiana facilities); United
States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (same).
16
See, e.g., Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 246 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001)
(prohibiting by consent decree race and gender discrimination and harassment
of employees of New Jersey Department of Corrections); Watson v. Ray, 192
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plaintiffs are citizens (or the federal government) and the
defendant a state or municipal agency.17 Such decrees raise issues
of appropriate remedies18 and how those remedies should be

F.3d 1153 (8th Cir. 1999) (requiring by consent decree between Iowa State
Penitentiary inmates and state officials, certain minimum prison conditions);
Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1996) (requiring by consent decree
between North Carolina citizen program applicants and the state’s
administrators of welfare and Medicaid programs, that the administrators
process claims with certain timeliness); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d
Cir. 1985) (establishing ability of parties to enforce consent decrees through
contempt actions and requiring the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services to provide certain benefits to aliens); Chairs v. Burgess, 25 F.
Supp.2d 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (establishing a consent decree between
Alabama jail inmates and corrections officials prohibiting overcrowding in
jails and requiring timely transfers of inmates to prisons); United States v.
City of Philadelphia, 499 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (restraining by
consent decree gender discrimination in Philadelphia Police Department); Doe
v. Dinkins, 192 A.D.2d 270 (1st Dep’t 1993) (establishing the so-called
“Callahan consent decree” requiring New York City to provide shelter for any
qualified homeless man).
17
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) (concluding that the
separation of powers doctrine ought to inform a court’s exercise of equitable
powers in institutional reform litigation). Professor Nagel recognized, on the
other hand, that the Supreme Court stated the opposite in Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976), and the “extreme pressures that can exist for using the
federal courts as substitutes [for legislative and executive action].” Id. at 664.
He was concerned that fundamental democratic values were going to be
sacrificed “in order to vindicate particular constitutional rights,” id. at 664,
and thus courts ought to defer to judgments of state executive and legislative
actors. Id. at 719. See also Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal
Consent Decrees Against State Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1796 (1988) (arguing that the federal courts’ powers over state administrative
agencies raise significant federalism concerns); Tamia Perry, Note, In the
Interest of Justice: The Impact of Court-Ordered Reform on the City of New
York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1239 (1991) (considering the impact on the
autonomy of New York City government actors from the imposition of federal
orders).
18
See Colin S. Diver, Special Project-The Remedial Process in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978) (detailing the
problems facing the creation of remedies and discussing how to represent the
interests of the parties).
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constructed and applied when the plaintiffs represent a class.19
Consent decrees are entered into in the pursuit of institutional
reform.20 They are sometimes necessary to force government
agencies to achieve their mandates within constitutional bounds.21
Plaintiffs generally seek declaratory relief that a particular
practice violates their rights in some way. They also seek
injunctive relief, which, if obtained, serves to order the agency to
do or stop doing something.22 Consent decrees are attractive to
defendants because defendants can contribute to the expedited
outcome of the case.23 Consent decrees are attractive to plaintiffs
because rights are vindicated and the federal courts oversee
implementation in the event that agencies refuse to abide by the
law.24 Consent decrees are also attractive to plaintiffs because
they provide relief that may not be available through litigation.
Of course, consent decrees are not a panacea. Parties are
sometimes reluctant to abide by the terms of a decree.25
Moreover, as judicial instruments, the decrees are susceptible to
19

See Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII
Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 198
DUKE L.J. 887 (1984) (questioning how the agreements reached in Title VII
consent decrees can be fair to all people involved when such cases include
people who are not parties).
20
See, e.g., Diver, supra note 18, at 809-12 (discussing the remedial
process when the settlements have been negotiated as in most consent orders).
21
Horowitz, supra note 13, at 1266-67 (recognizing courts as actors in
reform).
22
See generally Anderson, supra note 11 (discussing in detail all elements
that should be present in a workable consent decree and reviewing case studies
of three consent decrees); Horowitz, supra note 13, at 1266-67 (discussing the
structural injunctions imposed on the courts through reform litigation.
23
Anderson, supra note 11, at 726.
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Karla Grossenbacher, Note, Implementing Structural
Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officials Resist, 80 GEO. L.J. 2227
(1992) (discussing Spallone v. United States and arguing that given the ability
to pursue options to enforce the decrees, federal judges ought to act forcibly to
ensure that the relief is actually forthcoming); Eric A. Rosand, Note, Consent
Decrees in Welfare Litigation: The Obstacles to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 83 (1994) (discussing the necessity of parties to continuously
sue to enforce the consent decrees they have obtained).
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manipulation.26 The fact that a settlement has not been litigated
extensively is not necessarily evidence that the settlement
performed its task.27 Lack of litigation could also be due to
factors impeding the capacity of either party to get to court,28 or
it could mean that the parties addressed all the subsequent issues
of implementation outside the courtroom.29
B. Judicial Intervention and Modification of Consent Decrees
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to
modify consent decrees.30 Specifically, Rule 60(b)(5) provides
that on motion the court can relieve a party from a final judgment
or order if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application.”31 Courts can also provide relief for
“any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.”32 Historically, the Supreme Court recognized that
26

See, e.g., Julie K. Rademaker, Note, Alliance to End Repression v.
City of Chicago: Judicial Abandonment of Consent Decree Principles, 80 NW.
U.L. REV. 1675 (1986) (arguing that the interpretation of the consent order in
that case ignored fundamental aspects of the original agreement).
27
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 727 (noting that lack of litigation could
result from the court prodding the parties along without resort to formal
judicial measures).
28
Id. at 728 (noting alternatively that the absence of written opinions
might be the consequence of a defendant evading enforcement or the plaintiffs
losing interest).
29
Id. (recognizing that “[e]ach decree involves its own unique
circumstances and a reader should not judge the success of a decree merely by
whether it generates court opinions”); see also Horowitz, supra note 13, at
1302 (noting that courts prefer that parties handle subsequent issues without
judicial oversight).
30
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (allowing for modification of court orders by
motion for relief from a judgment or order pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
237-39 (1997) (allowing relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(5) where the
Supreme Court found establishment clause law had significantly changed).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, 863 n.11 (1988) (recognizing federal
court authority to relieve a party from judgment in the extraordinary
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even where the order is by consent, a “court does not abdicate its
power to revoke or modify its mandate, if satisfied that what it
has been doing has been turned into, through changing
circumstances, an instrument of wrong.”33 The Court also
cautioned that “[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead” a
court to modify the agreement.34 According to the Court, a new
statute altering the rights of the parties is one circumstance that
can require the modification of a consent decree.35 At least one
lower court noted that Rule 60(b) assumes the propriety of the
order and refers instead to “some change in conditions that
makes continued enforcement inequitable.”36
The leading case governing modification of consent decrees
in institutional reform litigation is Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail.37 In Rufo, the Supreme Court ruled that courts
circumstance where the district judge presiding over a dispute had a fiduciary
interest in an interested party).
33
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932) (holding
that a prospective decree is always subject to adaptation as necessary). In
Swift, modification was not allowed because the evidence showed that the
defendant corporation would return to its abuse of power as a meat packing
monopoly. Id. at 117. Meat packing corporations sought to modify the consent
decree to allow them to sell groceries as well as meat, but cited no changes
that warranted modification. Id. at 116.
34
Id. at 119.
35
Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364
U.S. 642, 651-652 (1961) (citing Swift for the proposition that courts have the
power to modify consent decrees). Employees and corporation had agreed on a
specific price to not establish a union shop. Id. at 644. The statute governing
employment of railroad workers was amended, allowing for unions. Id. The
petitioners moved for modification of the consent decree but the district court
denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 646. The Supreme
Court reversed, recognizing that the parties could not require enforcement of
rights that the statute no longer offered. Id. at 652.
36
Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that
plaintiff tax objector was entitled to maintenance of order as issued where
facts had not changed). The court in Schildhaus observed that Rule 60(b) was
not intended to be a substitute for an appeal from an erroneous judgment. Id.
at 531.
37
502 U.S. 367 (1992) (establishing the test for modification of consent
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should no longer hold the proponent of modification to the
stringent grievous wrong standard when determining whether
modification is warranted.38 The consent decree in Rufo arose out
of a complaint by inmates in the Suffolk County Jail in Boston,
Massachusetts.39 The plaintiffs alleged, and the district court
found, unconstitutional conditions in the jail.40
Seventeen years after the original decree, the defendants
sought modification.41 The request was denied by the district
court,42 and the First Circuit upheld the denial.43 The Supreme
Court then reversed the decision and lowered the modification
threshold, holding that the “party seeking modification of a
consent decree must establish that a significant change in the facts
or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”44
decrees in institutional reform litigation). The consent decree between the
inmates and the Suffolk County sheriff “permanently enjoined the
government” from double-celling inmates. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 373. See also
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting
that the proposition laid out in Swift and System Federation No. 91 is well
established, and that modification authority still extends to consent decrees);
David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Adoption of the
Second Circuit’s Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1275-76 (1993)
(recognizing that the Court changed the Swift test and that the Rufo standard
for modification rests on the fact that institutional reform cases are fact
specific, and therefore flexibility in modification is warranted when facts have
changed).
38
See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393.
39
See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D.
Mass. 1973), aff’d, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974).
40
Id. at 686 (holding that the pretrial detainment facility at issue
“unnecessarily and unreasonably infringes upon [the inmates’] most basic
liberties, among them the rights to reasonable freedom of motion, personal
cleanliness, and personal privacy”).
41
See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561 (D.
Mass. 1990).
42
Id. at 566.
43
See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.
1990).
44
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992).
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Further, the modification must neither create nor perpetuate a
constitutional violation45 and should not seek the constitutional
floor.46 The Rufo Court prescribed consideration of whether the
primary purpose of the consent decree had been achieved.47 The
Court did not, however, hold that satisfaction of the primary
purpose is a necessary precursor to modification.48
The flexible test outlined in Rufo did not shift the burden;
defendants still must prove that facts and law have changed to
warrant modification.49 Plaintiffs do not, after Rufo, have the
burden of showing that those circumstances have not changed.50
The Court noted that a change in the law as a result of decisions
clarifying the law can only constitute “a change in the
circumstances that would support modification if the parties had
based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing
law.”51 Lamentably, the Court’s opinion provides very little
guidance to determine whether and how the law has changed.52
45

Id. at 391 (noting that petitioners, to prevail on this prong, would have
to show that double-celling of pretrial detainees at the Suffolk County Jail was
constitutional).
46
Id. The Court noted that because the district court had determined that
conditions at the jail were unconstitutional, and that because the parties had
settled on particular relief, a modification that removed all the protections
above what had been determined as constitutional was prohibited. Id.
47
Id. at 382. But see Levine, supra note 37, at 1268-69 (arguing that the
determination of the primary purpose, unless such a primary purpose is
explicitly laid out by the parties, is very difficult and leaves the door open for
appellate review).
48
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 382.
49
Levine, supra note 37, at 1269-70.
50
Id. Had that occurred, only defendants would have the benefit of the
flexible test. Id.
51
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 390 (1992)
(recognizing that the sheriff would have to establish that the parties mistakenly
believed that single-celling of pretrial detainees was mandated by the
Constitution to warrant modification).
52
Levine, supra note 37, at 1273-75 (noting that a determination of
whether the law has changed for purposes of modification could depend on
whether the defendants had committed to abiding by their constitutional
obligations or committed to abiding by an injunction not required by the
Constitution).
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II. THE HANDSCHU SETTLEMENT
The events leading up to the Handschu Settlement consisted
of abusive police practices sufficiently shocking to compel
plaintiffs to sue.53 The plaintiffs extracted some major
concessions from the NYPD in the shape of promises by the
police to conduct their activities within certain parameters and
created a mechanism for individuals to determine whether their
rights had been violated.54 The limited subsequent litigation of the
settlement suggests its effectiveness at establishing oversight and
promoting deterrence.55 Defendants moved to modify the
settlement in September 2002 to remove its principal protections,
and the district court granted the modification request.56
A. Arriving at Handschu
In the 1960s the NYPD stepped up surveillance and other
investigatory efforts to include “more undercover and other
surveillance of ‘groups that because of their conduct or rhetoric
may pose a threat to life, property, or governmental
administration’; of ‘malcontents’; and ‘of groups or individuals
whose purpose is the disruption of governmental activities for the
peace and harmony of the community.’”57 Police officials
53

See infra Part II.A (discussing background of the decree).
See infra Part II.A (describing terms of the settlement).
55
See infra Part II.B (discussing subsequent litigation). That is, when
police acted outside the settlement, the plaintiffs went to court and obtained
judgments that their rights had been violated, even though they could not get
the court to hold the defendants in contempt.
56
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3643, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2003) (accepting the NYPD’s
additions to the patrol guide). See also Tom Perrotta, Police Win Battle to
Remove Restrictions on Surveillance, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 2003, at 2 (reporting
that the district court had agreed to the modifications sought by the
defendants); infra Part II.B (listing defendants’ arguments and discussing the
district court’s decision).
57
Aff. of New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy
[hereinafter Murphy Aff.], quoted in Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F.
Supp. 1384, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Chevigny, supra note 6, at 73554
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conceded that their activities included intelligence gathering “not
limited to investigations of crime, but related to any activity
likely to result in ‘a serious police problem.’”58 For example, a
two-year investigation of one citizen, which yielded a single,
unregistered and subsequently suppressed handgun, comprised,
according to the court, countless unconscionable violations of the
individual’s rights and a terrific waste of city resources.59
A class of plaintiffs composed of various political groups
36 (noting that political surveillance, which had existed as early as 1904 with
the NYPD’s “Italian Squad,” became more active in the 1960s). One reason
for the increased activity was that the police had more work to deal with an
increase in “demands for reform and radical change.” Id. at 736. Another was
public interest in knowing who and what were causing social upheaval of the
times. Id. Federal funding was made available to local law enforcement to
assist in surveillance efforts. Id.
58
Murphy Aff., supra note 57, quoted in Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at
1396 (acknowledging police investigations of radicals and protesters included
use of “infiltration and informers, and telephone wiretapping, electronic
eavesdropping, surreptitious recording of conversations, covert photography
of individuals attending demonstrations, and recording speeches at
demonstrations”). The police also would issue false press credentials to its
officers and would “routinely furnish information about individuals signing
petitions or attending meetings” to the state bar. Id. The case does not define a
“serious police problem.” Id. A reasonable place to look for a definition might
be where the police focused their resources. See, e.g., People v. Collier, 376
N.Y.S.2d. 954, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (discussing investigation of a Lower East
Side community activist). Vietnam War protesters were targets, Murphy Aff.,
supra note 57, quoted in Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1396, as were Black
Panthers, Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1397.
59
See People v. Collier, 376 N.Y.S.2d. at 958-59 (detailing the
circumstances of a particular wide-ranging investigation, while laying out the
activities of an undercover New York City Police detective over two years).
The court described how the detective was assigned to spy on the defendant
and followed this model citizen to a steady procession of school board
meetings, local hospital meetings, anti-drug campaign work and other general
community activism. Id. at 961-63. Part of the detective’s disguise included
holding himself out to be unemployed; the defendant actually tried to get the
detective work at various times, including letting him babysit for spending
cash. Id. at 967. The detective produced hundreds of memos on the defendant
and submitted them to his superiors in the Bureau of Special Services. Id. at
959. The trial court condemned this outrageous investigation at great length.
Id. at 979-88.
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filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York against the mayor and police commissioner of the City
of New York and other police officials.60 The complaint charged
that the infiltration and maintenance of information about the
plaintiff class violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment and other
constitutional rights.61 Plaintiffs further alleged that the
Intelligence Division of the NYPD engaged in summary
punishment to deter plaintiffs from lawful association and
political activity62 and that the activities of the NYPD had a
chilling effect on the exercise of the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights of speech, assembly and association.63
The plaintiff class and the NYPD agreed to a settlement,
which resulted in a consent decree, whereby the police would
conduct investigations of political actors only within certain

60

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(establishing plaintiff class of various political groups on behalf of themselves
and all residents of New York City that were or may in the future may become
targets of political surveillance by the NYPD).
61
See Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 768 (denying defendants’ motion to
dismiss). This action was brought by Professor Chevigny and others. Id. at
766. Plaintiffs alleged that seven specific categories of practices and conduct
of the Security and Investigation Section were unconstitutional. Id. The
categories were: use of informers, infiltration, interrogation, overt
surveillance, summary punishment, intelligence gathering and electronic
surveillance. Id. at 768. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
Id. at 767. One of the original plaintiffs was Shaba Om, a member of the
“Panther 21.” Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1384. The police had infiltrated the
Black Panthers and charged them with a plot to blow up department stores and
police stations, but the jury acquitted the Black Panthers on all counts after
determining police agents had “manipulated the defendants with ideas and
encouragement and then greatly exaggerated their misdeeds to police
superiors.” See Chisun Lee, The NYPD Wants to Watch You: Nation’s Largest
Law Enforcement Agency Vies for Total Spying Power, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec.
18-24, 2002, at 33 (discussing the background of Handschu).
62
Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 768.
63
Id. Police agents at public gatherings, for example, could create an
“atmosphere of fear and intimidation.” Chevigny, supra note 6, at 737. This
fear and intimidation would be compounded by the knowledge that the police
were collecting names and building dossiers. Id.
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limits.64 The settlement established an ‘Authority’ (the Authority)
to oversee the activities of the Public Security Section (PSS) of
the Intelligence Division.65 The majority decisions of the
Authority were binding on the PSS.66 The NYPD could not
engage in any investigation of political activity, which the
settlement defined as “the exercise of a right of expression or
association for the purpose of maintaining or changing
governmental policies or social conditions.”67 The settlement
authorized the PSS to commence an investigation only after the
NYPD established “specific information”68 that “a person or
group engaged in political activity is engaged in, about to engage
in, or threatened to engage in conduct which constitutes a

64

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff’d, 787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986).
65
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1417-24 (“Handschu Settlement”), § III.
Further references to the settlement will be to section number in annexed
pages 1417-24 to the district court opinion. The three members of the
Authority were the First Deputy Commissioner of the Police Department, the
Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs, and a civilian member appointed by
the mayor for a term revocable at will. Id. § III. The Public Security Section
(PSS) was the then current incarnation of the Special Services Division, named
in the original complaint. Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 767. These names,
‘PSS,’ ‘Intelligence Division,’ and ‘NYPD,’ as well as ‘police,’ are used
interchangeably.
66
Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 767. The membership of the Authority has
been criticized because the input of the civilian member can be nullified, as
majority decisions are binding. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1410 (agreeing that
the civilian member cannot be automatically assumed to be a “booby”). See
also David Berry, Note, The First Amendment and Law Enforcement
Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 207, 232 (1982) (arguing,
inter alia, that settlements, including the Handschu Settlement, are inadequate
to protect constitutional rights and citing the lack of independent oversight as
one factor exemplary of the inadequacy). But see Chevigny, supra note 6, at
765-66 (maintaining that the civilian member is a good and necessary part of
the Authority, defending the composition of the Authority with the observation
that settlements are the products of negotiations, and conceding that it would
be best, obviously, to have an independent review board with the ability to
conduct inquiries).
67
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § II.A.
68
Id. § IV.C.
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crime.”69 Prior to any criminal investigative efforts, the PSS had
to submit to the Authority an “Investigation Statement”
specifying the factual predicate.70 Approved investigations could
be conducted for thirty days, with possible extensions.71 If the
commanding officer of the Intelligence Division desired to use
undercover personnel in an investigation, the officer had to first
apply for approval showing good cause for the investigation and
that the use of undercover personnel was essential.72
Information obtained during investigations of individuals,
groups or organizations could be collected or maintained only in
conformity with the settlement.73 Information “from publicly
available sources” could not be maintained with the PSS.74
Officers were only allowed to collect certain, general information
about a planned non-criminal event “in order to preserve the
peace, deploy manpower for control of crowds and protect the
right[s] of individuals to freedom of speech and assembly.”75
Specifically, the PSS could not retain information that an
individual had signed a particular petition, that an individual’s
name appeared on a particular mailing list, that an individual
financially supported a particular political group or the group’s
aims, or that an individual had published anything that could be
said to expound a particular political view.76 Information
collected pursuant to the settlement guidelines “[could] be
distributed only to law enforcement agencies or government

69

Id. § IV.C.
Id. § IV.C(1). If the PSS showed good cause, it could initiate the
investigation and apply for approval within forty-eight hours. Id. The factual
predicate is the specific information of criminal activity or threatened criminal
activity. Id.
71
Id. § IV.C(6)(b).
72
Id. § IV.C(6).
73
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.A. To be in conformity with
the settlement, the approvals must have been sought and obtained. Id.
74
Id. The settlement does not define publicly available sources. Id.
75
Id. § IV.B The information allowed to be collected in such an ‘Event
Planning Inquiry’ pertains to general information about the event. Id.
76
Id. § VI.B(1)-(4).
70
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agencies conducting security clearance procedures”77 and could
not be disseminated “unless the requesting agency agree[d] in
writing to conform strictly with the provisions” of the
settlement.78 The settlement prohibited developing a file on an
individual or group based solely on that individual’s or group’s
“political, religious, sexual or economic preference.”79
Additionally, the settlement created a mechanism for citizens
who believed they were the subjects of surveillance to obtain
confirmation of the surveillance from the Authority via an
inquiry.80 If the target of an investigation confirmed that
surveillance was conducted, the target could request that the
Authority inquire of the PSS to determine whether the
investigation was conducted in accordance with the settlement.81
If the Authority determined that the investigation violated the
settlement, the Authority would then determine the disposition of
the gathered material and submit a report to the police
commissioner, who was required to initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures.82 The activities of the PSS were reviewed
annually by the commanding officer of the Intelligence Division
and submitted to the Authority.83 The report included an
accounting of the past year’s investigations, which had to be
turned over to the police commissioner and submitted to the
mayor.84
The Second Circuit upheld the settlement in the face of strong

77

Id. § VII.A.
Id. § VII.D.
79
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.C.
80
Id. § V.A. There is no indication in the settlement how the Authority
conducts its inquiry. Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. § V.B. See also Berry, supra note 66, at 232 (critiquing the
Handschu Settlement and noting that disciplinary measures are no substitute
for real punishment of violations).
83
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VIII.
84
Id. §§ IX.A-B. There is no indication in the settlement what the mayor
is to do with the report. Id. There is also no mention of any public reporting
requirement. Id.
78
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objections.85 Those who objected were concerned that settling
would inhibit public awareness of police abuse and that the
NYPD would not be held accountable for past wrongs visited
upon New York City residents.86 That is, past illegal activities of
the NYPD would not be adjudicated, and the settlement
incorporated no admissions of wrongdoing by the NYPD.87
Objectors also feared that the settlement would prevent New
Yorkers from benefiting from constitutional principles that might
arise after the settlement had been approved.88 The objectors
were concerned that if the law changed in the future to
incorporate, for example, stronger First Amendment protections,
the settlement would stifle the change’s application to the plaintiff
class of New York residents.89
The district court noted that the desire to have the defendants
admit their wrongs was understandable but was inconsistent with
the nature of settlements.90 To allay the objectors’ fears, the court
acknowledged the settlement’s flexibility, writing that “if future
cases declare constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges
which do not presently exist, the Guidelines are automatically
amended pro tanto.”91 Discussing the wording of the Handschu
85

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 787 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1986).
The objectors complained that they did not have notice of the settlement, but
the court considered the uproar among the groups as evidence that the due
process requirements of notice were met. Handschu, 787 F.2d at 832-33. The
objectors also did not consider the settlement agreement fair and reasonable,
but the court thought otherwise, concluding that the plaintiffs had obtained
“very respectable” concessions from the NYPD. Id. at 834; see also
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1397-99.
86
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1398 (noting objectors’ concerns);
Chevigny, supra note 6, at 761-65 (addressing objectors concerns).
87
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1399.
88
Id. at 1405.
89
Id.
90
Id. The court recognized the objectors’ “passionate desire . . . that
whatever illegalities the NYPD perpetrated in earlier years be exposed to the
light of day by a full plenary record. It is easy enough to understand that
desire in human terms. But it is absolutely inconsistent with the salutary
purpose of class action settlements.” Id.
91
Id. at 1406 (internal citations removed). “Pro tanto” means that the
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Settlement, Judge Haight remarked:
If, as defendants’ counsel profess, the NYPD has
abandoned any prior abuses and now views constitutional
principles with pure and undistilled enthusiasm, no words
of restraint are necessary; the millenium [sic] is at hand.
If, as objectors apparently believe, the NYPD is
mendacious, untrustworthy, and unalterably committed to
continuing constitutional violations, no words are
sufficient to avoid future controversy. I think it likely the
real world lies somewhere between these two poles.92
B. Litigation of the Settlement
Subsequent litigation of the Handschu Settlement revealed
that the real world did indeed lie somewhere between the poles.
From 1989 to 1990, the plaintiffs litigated the settlement three
times, using the mechanisms of the settlement to invoke their
rights.93 Defendants sought to modify the settlement in September
2002 and render the mechanisms much less useful.94 Modification
was granted, and plaintiffs apparently are not planning an
appeal.95

settlement would have incorporated whatever constitutional protections might
have arisen. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (6th ed. 1990).
92
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1409-10. The court was discussing the
wording of the settlement with respect to how much of a showing the police
would need to make in order to get approval to use informers on an
investigation. Id.
93
See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 131 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 838 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
94
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 5.
95
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003). See New Police Guidelines Go into Effect,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 2003, at 1 (noting that civil liberties lawyers recently said
they would not oppose the ruling).
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1. Invoking Handschu

In 1989 the plaintiffs made two separate motions to hold the
defendants in contempt; the court refused both.96 In the first,
plaintiffs alleged that police surveillance of black activists and a
radio station violated the settlement.97 The court found that
monitoring the station violated the settlement but did not hold
defendants in contempt, noting that some ambiguities were
inevitable when guidelines such as those in Handschu are put in
place.98 In the second, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had purposefully destroyed records plaintiffs wished to
discover.99 The court did not consider the destruction of records
“deliberate sabotage” and appointed a document retrieval
expert.100 The expert’s job was to facilitate retrieval of the
documents that the defendants claimed were not produced due to
administrative difficulties.101
The Handschu Settlement was also litigated in 1990,102 when
plaintiffs sought to access notes created by an investigation
conducted by undercover police agents.103 The agents had
attended meetings of the New York City Civil Rights Coalition
(the Coalition), a citizen group “formed . . . to explore the
problem of racial bigotry in New York City.”104 The Authority
96

Handschu, 737 F. Supp. at 1308-09; Handschu, 838 F. Supp. at 81.
Handschu, 737 F. Supp. at 1291. The activists were the “New York 8”
who were charged but acquitted of conspiracy to free two prisoners. Id. at
1304. The police were listening to and taping WLIB to be alerted to
“announcements of demonstrations and meetings of interest . . . [,]
commentaries by community leaders relating to police activities . . . and
comments of members of the New York 8.” Id. at 1295.
98
Id. at 1308.
99
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 838 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 131 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(granting a motion by the New York City Civil Rights Coalition to compel
discovery on its claim that the defendants were violating the settlement by
spying on the Coalition’s activity).
103
Id. at 51.
104
Id. This group was formed after the Howard Beach incident. Id.; see
97
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had previously supplied the Coalition with limited information
indicating the investigation had taken place and that some
information was obtained in violation of the settlement.105 Judge
Haight ordered discovery, stressing that this type of discovery
order exemplified the type authorized by the settlement.106
2. Unsettling Handschu
In September 2002, the defendants requested modification of
the decree to “eliminate the restrictions on the investigation of
‘political activity.’”107 Defendants’ contended that the settlement
was no longer equitable in light of changes in “factual
circumstances.”108 They cited a string of attacks on United States
military and civilian targets for the proposition that the NYPD
“had no conception of the challenge it would face in protecting
the City and its people from international terrorism” when it
also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 58 (1991).
In 1986, three black men were beaten by a group of white teenagers in the
predominantly white community of Howard Beach in Queens. Id. One of the
victims fled the group and, in attempting to escape across a highway, was hit
by a car and killed. Id. What ensued in the public and press was an ugly,
racist display founded on an implicit notion that the presence of the men in
that neighborhood itself was threatening to the community and the beatings
thus warranted. Id. at 58-59. For a full account of the incident and aftermath,
see generally id. at 58-61.
105
Handschu, 131 F.R.D. at 51.
106
Id. at 52.
107
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 5. The NYPD, following its
September 2002 modification motion, asked the district court to review sealed
testimony of Intelligence Commissioner David Cohen. Tom Perrotta, Police
Ask Court to View Secret Papers: City Seeks Modification of Surveillance
Rule, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 1. This testimony was supplemental to that
contained in the motion and apparently based upon confidential information
the public release of which would have compromised an ongoing investigation.
Id. The police filed additional papers that denied that the modifications sought
constituted a post-September 11 power grab. Tom Perrotta, Police Defend Bid
to Relax Spying Rules, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 2002, at 1. The police further
alleged that the safety of New Yorkers would be jeopardized by continued
adherence to the settlement agreement. Id.
108
Id.
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agreed to the settlement in 1985.109 Defendants also stated that a
“terrorist infiltration of America” had occurred,110 that the
“present terrorist threat requires the concerted compilation and
exchange of data,” and that the settlement precluded the NYPD
from these functions.111

109

Id. at 12. Specifically, the defendants cited:
The bombing of military bases in Saudi Arabia; the killing of nineteen
U.S. airmen in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing; the October 2000
attack on the battleship Cole in Yemen; the assault on United States
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in August
1998; the World Trade Center bombing of 1993; and the September
11th destruction of the World Trade Center and accompanying attacks
on the Pentagon.

Id.
110

Id. at 13. It should be noted here that the terms “terrorist” or
“terrorism” ought to be cautiously invoked because they are ambiguous. See,
e.g., United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 524-44 (6th Cir. 2001) (Cohn,
J., dissenting) (analyzing, in detail, the legislative history of one of the federal
definitions of terrorism and the difficulties agreeing on what constitutes
terrorism); United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (W.D.N.Y.
2002) (analyzing the definition of terrorism from 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2002), 18
U.S.C. § 2339(B) (2002) and 22 U.S.C. § 2656(f) (2002)). See also 22
U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (defining terrorism for the U.S. Department of Defense as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience”). The definitions are ambiguous because
sometimes what objectively appears to be terrorism is not so designated;
conversely, the term can be used very broadly. Compare William Blum,
American Empire for Dummies: A Talk Given in Boulder Colorado, ZNET, at
http://www.zmag.org/content (Oct. 21, 2002) (discussing American
intervention in other nation’s affairs that would fit this definition, among them
the squashing of “dissident movements” throughout Latin America in the
1950s through the 1980s, the 1989 invasion of Panama, intervention in
Nicaraguan elections, the bombings of Iraq and Yugoslavia, and the support
for Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch), with Mitchell Plitnik, Terror and History,
ZNET, at http//:www.zmag.org/Znet.html (Nov. 6, 2002) (demonstrating the
use of the word terror to describe the Washington D.C. sniper). An everyday
definition is preferable; for the purposes of analysis this note defines
“terrorism” as a violent act in support of or for the purpose of furthering
particular political goals.
111
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 17.
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According to the defendants, the settlement was too
restrictive.112 Their motion requested a reduction in the role of
the Authority so that its sole function would be to review records
to determine whether constitutional violations had occurred.113
Specifically, the defendants claimed the “criminal activity
requirement” prohibited defendants from investigating the legal
preparatory activities of terrorist operatives.114 Defendants argued
that “in the case of terrorism, to wait for an indication of crime
before investigating is to wait far too long.”115 This inability to
investigate lawful activities restricted the “development of
intelligence and the sharing of that intelligence.”116
In response, plaintiffs did not deny that circumstances had
changed in New York City.117 Instead, they posited in their brief
and at oral argument that the settlement would not interfere with
terrorism investigations.118 They also contended that the terrorism
of September 11 did not involve protected political activity.119
Judge Haight analyzed the request for modification under the

112

Id. at 14.
Id. at 5; Defs.’ Notice of Motion, Annexed Decl. of Gail Donoghue,
at 2, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003).
114
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 5.
115
Defs.’ Notice of Mot., Annexed Decl. of Deputy Commissioner for
Intelligence David Cohen [hereinafter Cohen Decl.], at 15, Handschu, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134.
116
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 14.
117
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, *28; see also Lee, supra
note 61, at 32 (reporting that plaintiffs “acknowledge[d] that September 11
was uniquely tragic but deny that it created a reason to grant police free access
to lawful people’s private information”).
118
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *29-30 (quoting plaintiffs’
brief that “[t]he Handschu Guidelines do not restrict the investigation and
prevention of terrorism. They have no bearing on police action except when
an investigation focuses on a group or person engaged in political activity”).
119
Id. at *30 (quoting plaintiffs’ brief that “[t]he Guidelines would not
have interfered with the investigation of the September 11th hijackers because
they were involved in no protected political activity, in New York or
anywhere else.”).
113
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test articulated by the Supreme Court in Rufo.120 He first
considered whether defendants made a threshold showing of a
change in facts or law requiring revision.121 He noted:
There is no disputing Deputy Commissioner Cohen’s
assertion that since the formulation of the Handschu
Guidelines in 1985, ‘the world has undergone remarkable
changes, . . . not only in terms of new threats we face but
also in the ways we communicate and the technology we
now use, and are used by those who seek to harm us.’122
Judge Haight stated that “these fundamental changes in the
threats to public security are perfectly apparent to every
individual with any awareness of what is happening in the
world.”123 Thus the court determined that changed circumstances
warranted modification.124
Judge Haight disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument by noting
that he could not “accept its implicit assumption: that terrorists
would never in furtherance of their unlawful purposes participate
in ‘lawful political, religious, educational or social activities.’”125
He supported this by pointing to the defendants’ assertion that
one of the individuals convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing was an imam126 and concluded that “the Handschu
Guidelines may impose restrictions upon the NYPD’s ability to
investigate terrorism.”127 Judge Haight noted that the plaintiffs
did not offer evidence to rebut the defendants’ contentions.128 He
therefore found no basis to doubt the contentions that, in general,
120

Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *26.
Id.
122
Id. at *27.
123
Id. at *28.
124
Id. at *40.
125
Id. at *33. In other words, terrorists would never participate in
activities that the settlement was supposed to protect. Id.
126
Id. An imam is an Islamic religious leader. See Irshad Abdal-Haqq,
Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. &
CULTURE 27, 54 (2002). Exercise of religion is protected by the constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend I.
127
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *35.
128
Id.
121
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the criminal activity requirement and the limits on collection and
retention of information restricted police ability to investigate
terrorism.129
Judge Haight next considered whether the requested
modification was suitably tailored to the changed
circumstances.130 He determined that the modified Handschu
guidelines suggested by the defendants did not create or
perpetuate a constitutional violation because it maintained the
police policy of conforming to “constitutionally guaranteed rights
and privileges.”131
Judge Haight also noted that it was within his discretion to
determine how closely modification could approach the
constitutional floor.132 He balanced the “cost or risk to the
public” of not modifying the settlement “to allow the NYPD to
combat terrorism” against the cost to the “values protected by the
First Amendment.”133 According to Judge Haight, the
modifications came very close to the constitutional floor but were
“justified by the unprecedented current public dangers of
terrorism.”134 He agreed with the defendants that maintaining the
Authority, even with its newly limited role, kept the modification
sufficiently above the constitutional floor to satisfy Rufo.135 The
NYPD’s promise to incorporate the substance of the FBI
Guidelines into the police patrol guide bolstered this
conclusion.136 Thus, Judge Haight found that modification was

129

Id. at *37-38.
Id. at *40.
131
Id. at *41-42.
132
Id. at *45.
133
Id. at *45-47 (quoting Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago
and the United States Department of Justice, 742 F.2d 1007, 1016 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc)).
134
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *47.
135
Id. at *51.
136
Id. at *21-23. See Att’y General’s Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations [hereinafter
FBI Guidelines], at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (May
30, 2002) (amending guidelines that had been in place since the 1980s to
include more explicit references to conducting investigations of terrorism).
130
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required and suitably tailored to the change in circumstances.137
In doing so, the court noted a third Rufo command: to “give
significant weight to the views of the local government officials
who must implement any modifications” because those officials
“have primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving the problems of institutional reform.”138 Judge Haight
assigned significant weight to the opinions of NYPD officials.139
He then quoted Judge Posner’s invocation of the specter of
terrorism in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,140
writing:
[M]indful of the crucial importance of preserving both
individual freedoms and public safety, and balancing the
legitimate demands of those two goals to the best of my
ability, I conclude that the NYPD is entitled to a
conditional order of the Court approving the proposed
modifications to the consent decree and to the Handschu
Guidelines.141
Ultimately, he conditioned the modifications on the NYPD’s
prompt submission to him of the text of the substance of the FBI
Guidelines.142
137

Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *51.
Id. at *60 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
367, 392 n.14 and 391 (1992)).
139
Id. at *60.
140
Id. (citing Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d
799, 802 (2d Cir. 2001), which modified, due to changed circumstances, a
consent decree arising from Chicago police investigations of political groups);
see also infra Part III.B.
141
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *62-63.
142
Id. at *63-64; see also FBI Guidelines, supra note 136. It should be
noted here that an additional, perhaps more chilling, development is on the
horizon: federal legislation rumored to be originating with the Department of
Justice that could terminate the Handschu Settlement even if plaintiffs appeal.
See Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion
of Anti-Terrorism Act, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/list.asp?L1=10&L2=0&L3=0&L4=
0&L5=0 (Feb. 7, 2003) (providing an electronic copy of the Domestic
Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Confidential Draft Jan 9, 2003)). In the
Act’s “Section by Section Analysis,” the Handschu Settlement is mentioned by
138
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III. HANDSCHU REMAINS VITAL
Accepting that Handschu’s protection of an individual’s First
and Fourth Amendment rights hinders the NYPD’s ability to
fight terrorism requires accepting the following difficult
proposition, which should be rejected: the political views of
dissenters raise suspicion of terrorism.143 It was predictable that
the police would invoke the stressfulness of the current climate to
modify the decree and use modification as a cover for an interest
in suppressing dissent.144 But, contrary to the defendants’
name:
During the 1970s and 1980s, some law enforcement agencies-e.g.,
the New York City Police Department-entered consent decrees that
limit such agencies from gathering information about organizations
and individuals that may be engaged in terrorist activities and other
criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., Handschu . . . . As a result, they
lack the ability to use the full range of investigative techniques that
are lawful under the Constitution, and that are available to the FBI.
(For example, the Attorney General’s investigative guidelines
authorize agents, subject to certain restrictions, to attend public places
and events “on the same terms and conditions as members of the
public generally.”) The consent decrees also handicap officers in their
efforts to share information with other law enforcement agencies,
including federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. These
problems threaten to frustrate the operations of the federal-state-local
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and could prevent effective cooperation
at all levels of government in antiterrorism efforts. . . . This proposal
would discontinue most consent decrees that could impede terrorism
investigations conducted by federal, state or local law enforcement
agencies. It would immediately terminate most decrees that were
enacted before September 11, 2001 (including New York City’s). All
surviving decrees would have to be necessary to correct a current and
ongoing violation of a Federal right, extend no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and be narrowly drawn
and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
Domestic Security Enhancement Act, Section by Section Analysis: Section
312: Appropriate Remedies with Respect to Law Enforcement Surveillance
Activities, at (Confidential Draft Jan. 9, 2003).
143
See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing link between political activity and
terrorism).
144
See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing government use of stressful times to
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arguments and the court’s determination, changes in
circumstances since September 11 with respect to the consent
decree are not sufficient to require modification.145 Ultimately,
the modifications impermissibly seek the constitutional floor, risk
constitutional violations and are not tailored to any changed
circumstances.146
A. Analysis and Arguments in Context
In times of relative societal calm, courts should seek to
protect fundamental constitutional rights, such as those protected
by the First Amendment, that come under harsh attack in
“pathological” times.147 Vigorous protection of these rights in
times of calm provides greater stability for the future.148 This is
particularly necessary because in stressful times the courts will be
constrained in their ability to monitor concentrations of executive
power.149 To be sure, it is difficult to pin down exactly when
suppress dissent).
145
See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that modifying decree cannot be shown
to assist with preventing terrorism).
146
See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that defendants’ arguments cannot
justify modifications).
147
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 456, 459-62 (1985) (arguing that the
doctrine surrounding certain core constitutional rights, and specifically the
First Amendment, ought to be formulated with an eye toward pathological
time periods). Professor Blasi defines pathology as a “social phenomenon,
characterized by a notable shift in attitudes regarding the tolerance of
unorthodox ideas. What makes a period pathological is [an increased]
likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be punished for what
they say or believe.” Id. at 450. This note employs Blasi’s formulation for
analytical purposes.
148
Id. at 512. This is because the strength of constitutional ideals is most
severely tested in pathological times, and if those ideals had solid grounding in
other times they would be more robust when tested. Id. at 456.
149
Id. at 507; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218
(1944) (upholding as constitutional a military wartime decision to round up
and detain people of Japanese descent); Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but
One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998) and
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pathological times are upon us.150 The years leading up to World
War I, the years of World War II and the McCarthy era are
generally considered exemplary pathological times.151 The year
following September 11, 2001, could also be included.152 Since
September 11, vulnerable constitutional rights have been under
attack and society has not tolerated dissent.153 Intolerance of
commenting on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s belief that it is not of concern that in
times of national security crisis, civil liberties suffer); Anthony Lewis,
Marbury v. Madison v. Ashcroft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at A17
(recognizing that the Supreme Court “disappointed us” when it refused to
interfere with the internment of Japanese Americans, and that judges cannot
“close their eyes to violations of our rights” during a possibly endless war on
terrorism). There is something of an inverse relationship between executive
power and civil liberties: civil liberties contract as executive power expands,
and vice versa.
150
See Blasi, supra note 147, at 466.
151
See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
329 (Douglas, J, concurring). Referring to “the flood of cases before us this
term . . . we are currently in the throes of another national seizure of
paranoia, resembling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedition
Acts, the Palmer Raids, and the McCarthy era.” Id.
152
Blasi, supra note 147, at 464 (citing examples of events that precipitate
a pathological period outside of the most natural example of a nation going to
war). Among those are “a sudden disturbance of a comfortable way of life” or
“[v]ivid reminders of a group’s or nation’s vulnerability.” Id.; see also Bush
Speaks of Security To Group of U.S. Attorneys, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001,
at B7. “But we’re at war. The enemy has declared war on us. They . . . seek
to destroy our country and our way of life.” Id. (quoting President George W.
Bush).
153
See, e.g., Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy Before the Senate Jud.
Comm., 106th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (testimony of Attorney General John
Ashcroft, who said, “[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms
of lost liberty . . . your tactics only aid terrorists.”), quoted in David Cole,
Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (arguing that it is the liberty of
non-citizens, not the liberty of citizens, that Americans have been historically,
and are now even more willing, to give up); David Glenn, The War on
Campus: Will Academic Freedom Survive?, THE NATION, Dec. 3, 2001
(discussing pressures put on professors at the University of New Mexico and
UNC-Chapel Hill, a library assistant at UCLA, and condemnation of teach-ins
at CUNY, all for academic commentary about the U.S. response to September
11); Bill Pennington, Player’s Protest Over the Flag Divides Fans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at D1 (reporting that a college basketball player’s act
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dissent is a distinctive feature of pathological periods.154
Discussing the pathology of these times requires recognizing
that periods of heightened national security do not become so
without some influence from the government.155 In other words,
compliant mass media that parrots the official story provided by
government sources contribute to national hysteria.156 This
of facing away from the flag during the national anthem made her a
controversial figure); Bill Berkowitz, Academic Bashing, at ZNET,
http://www.zmag.org/znet.html (Nov. 6, 2002) (discussing the new study of
university faculty by the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA)
and recognizing effort to label university professors as anti-American where
they question governmental policy). ACTA was founded by Lynn Cheney and
Senator Joseph Lieberman in 1995. Id. The report condemns university faculty
as being the “weak link” in America’s response to terrorism. Id. Such a report
seeks to stifle dissenting voices on campus and everywhere by listing those
that seriously consider government policy. Id.
154
Blasi, supra note 147, at 457 (noting that “[t]he aggressive impulse to
be intolerant of others resides within all of us”). “It is a powerful instinct. . . .
When the constraints imposed by [socialized norms about the value of free
speech] lose their effectiveness . . . the power of the instinct toward
intolerance usually generates a highly charged collective mentality.” Id. The
constraints on this aggressive intolerance are removed in stressful times, and
“the problem is compounded by the fact that the suppression of dissent
[manifests itself] in the guise of political affirmation, of insisting that everyone
stand up and be counted in favor of the supposed true values of the political
community.” Id. at 457-58; see also United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp.
1074, 1079 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (recognizing the influence of the stressfulness
of the Vietnam era on the public). “In this turbulent time of unrest, it is often
difficult for the established and contented members of our society to tolerate,
much less try to understand [the views of political opponents of the
government].” Id.
155
Interview by Znet with Robert McChesney & John Nichols, ZNET,
Nov. 6, 2002 (discussing their recent book explaining the struggle between
free and independent press which serves the people on the one hand and
concentrated corporate media subservient to power on the other),
http://www.zmag.org/znet.html. For a detailed analysis of powerful interests
shaping information, see generally EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988) (establishing a model for understanding
how information contrary to the needs of powerful institutions is suppressed
and controlled in a democracy and applying that model to news stories of the
1970s and 1980s).
156
See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 155, at 18-23 (recognizing elite
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deference benefits those in power when the media ignore and
suppress stories that conflict with governmental interests.157
History predicts that government actors will invoke the
stressfulness of a climate to justify abuses or extraordinary
exercises of power.158 Indeed, in their request to modify the
influence on mass media). This contention, that media is subservient to the
interests of power, allows for some contrary evidence. Thus, articles
occasionally appear in mainstream publications the content of which may seem
to undermine views routinely espoused in those publications. Id. This theory
may explain how the majority of news coverage of the war on terrorism
examines both the U.S. vulnerability to terrorism and a high-ranking U.S.
military official’s contrary opinion. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Philip Shenon,
General Sees Scant Evidence of Close Threat in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2002, at A26 (noting that the head of the military’s Northern Command, four
star General Ralph E. Eberhart, who oversees domestic counterterrorism
efforts, does not consider threat of terrorism to be “significant”).
157
HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 155, at 26-28. Noting the
institutional attributes of media does not dismiss the public’s legitimate
concerns about safety or security; it merely points out that those concerns can
be driven to some extent by reporting and repetition of certain stories and how
those stories are framed. Id. at 23. It is beyond the scope of this note to
conduct an empirical analysis of news stories that dealt with the September 11
events with respect to their content and omissions. For readers interested in
news ignored by mainstream media, see, e.g., Censored 2003: Top 25
Censored Stories of 2001-2002, http://www.projectcensored.org/stories/2003/
default.htm (Mar. 23, 2003) (listing top stories not reported or underreported,
including U.S. efforts that could be considered terrorism).
158
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944)
(recognizing the threat of invasion by Japan during World War II to justify
internment of Japanese-Americans). The Court noted:
All citizens . . . feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure.
Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in
time of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of
large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances
of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic
governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to
protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.
Id. at 219-20. During World War I, the post office took away the use of the
mail for publications that printed antiwar articles. See HOWARD ZINN, A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 360 (1994). The Department of
Justice raided dozens of union meeting halls and seized documents later used
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Handschu Settlement defendants’ posited that times are different
now than in the past.159 Their actions demonstrate a predictable
attempt to take advantage of this pathological period.160
1. District Court Modification
In his decision to modify Handschu, Judge Haight focused on
the undisputed assertion in defendants’ papers that the conspiracy
to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993 was coordinated by an
imam.161 The court concluded that the defendants had met their
burden of showing that the settlement may impose restrictions on
the police because the plaintiffs could not show that terrorists
would never participate in lawful political or religious activities
or organizations.162 It is impossible, however, to contend that
terrorists never participate in lawful activities. The court
in trials for conspiracy to “hinder the draft [and] encourage desertion.” Id. at
363-64. And the New York Times quoted a former Secretary of War as saying:
“We must have no criticism now.” Id. at 359. Thus, from U.S. Solicitor
General Theodore Olson:
When you have a long period of time when you’re not engaged in a
war, people tend to forget, or put in the backs of their minds, the
necessity for certain types of government action used when we are in
danger, when we are facing eyeball to eyeball a serious threat.
Charles Lane, Parallel Legal Unit to Handle ‘Enemy Combatants,’ DAILY
GAZETTE (Schenectady), Dec. 1, 2002, at A13 (quoting the Solicitor General
in reference to the war on terror).
159
See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 12 (“When the Handschu
Guidelines were agreed to in 1985, the NYPD had no conception of the
challenge it would face in protecting the City and its people from international
terrorism”).
160
See Arundhati Roy, Come September, Speech at the Lensic
Performance Arts Center, Santa Fe, New Mexico, ZNET (Sept. 29, 2002)
(condemning the use of September 11 grief for political purpose as a “terrible,
violent thing for a State to do its people”), at http://www.zmag.org/content/
showarticle.cfm?itemID=2404&sectionID=15; see also supra note 158
(noting examples of government abuse during stressful times).
161
See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003); see also supra Part II.B.2
(describing the decision to grant modification).
162
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *33.
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correctly used the example of the notable imam as proof that
lawful political or religious activity has been used as a cover for
preparation of terrorist attacks.163 But reliance on this notion
raises the important question of what one should do with such
knowledge. Judge Haight’s argument allows for a dangerous
assumption and illegitimate next step: that political activity itself
becomes suspect in terrorism investigations simply because there
is crossover, at times, between lawful political or religious
activity and terrorist preparation.164 The real import of the
decision is that because protected political activity once crossed
paths with terrorist planning, political activity now can be
deemed a specific indication that criminal activity will or is
threatening to occur.165 Political activity thus can be said to raise
criminal suspicion.

163

Id. But see Andy Newman & Daryl Khan, Brooklyn Mosque Becomes
Terror Icon, but Federal Case is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 29
(noting that certain infamy has surrounded a Brooklyn mosque with accused
links to raising money for terrorism).
164
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *34-35 (requiring that
plaintiffs show that terrorists “have never engaged in . . . or will never in the
future [engage in political activity]”). The court reasoned that the breadth of
the plaintiff class necessitated the finding of a possible relationship between
political activities undertaken by the members of the plaintiff class and those
undertaken by terrorists. Id. at *34. Thus, the court determined that the
settlement’s restrictions on investigation of political activity may inadvertently
restrict the NYPD’s investigations of terrorism. Id. at *35. This note contends
that by focusing on the relationship between political activity and terrorist
activity without factoring in criminal activity whatsoever, the Handschu
Settlement modification creates a single-factor test for determining the
existence of suspected terrorist activity: political activity.
165
See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Foreward: McCarthyism, the Internment
and the Contradictions of Power, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 9, 17-18 (1998)
(recognizing, in a discussion of how Japanese-Americans were vilified during
World War II, that “[a]s with the threat of terrorism today, as with the
mysterious Communists that McCarthyism searched for, the lack of evidence
against the accused Japanese Americans became an additional solipsistic
reason to violate their rights: there was no other way to fight such a hidden
threat”).
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2. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants sought and obtained removal of the “criminal
activity requirement.”166 Removing the requirement that
investigations are based on suspected criminal activity eliminates
the underlying reason for the settlement.167 After modification,
the Authority no longer approves investigations based on whether
it considers officers to have sufficient basis to determine that
there is a crime to investigate.168 Thus, the only role for the
Authority is to investigate violations of the constitution.169 This is
an evisceration of the decree.170
The NYPD should not be permitted to avoid the requirement
that their investigations be based on specific information of
criminal activity. It is reasonable to require that virtually all
police investigations start with information that criminal activity
is afoot. In the absence of criminal activity, it follows to ask what
other factors are to be used as a basis for investigations. Neither
Judge Haight nor the NYPD specified the factors on which the
police would rely to begin investigations in the absence of
criminal activity.171 The defendants referred to “lawful
166

See Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *63; Defs.’ Mem. of
Law, supra note 5, at 14.
167
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 729 (noting that the success of a
consent decree is contingent upon “preserving the spirit” of consent that
attended its creation); Chevigny, supra note 6, at 737 (noting that the relief
sought in complaints of police surveillance was control of such surveillance in
non-criminal contexts).
168
See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 20 (“Under [the]
modification, the Authority . . . retain[s] a role in monitoring compliance with
the core policy of the decree: that police investigations ‘conform to
constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges’”).
169
Id. at 20-21.
170
See, e.g., Flynn & Fries, supra note 5, at A18 (reporting plaintiffs’
counsel as saying police were trying to undo the settlement).
171
See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134,
*36-37 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (finding no reason to doubt the defendants’
assertion that the criminal activity requirement inhibits terrorism investigations
but recognizing no other factor upon which police could rely to commence an
investigation).
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preparatory activities” of potential targets that may indicate
conduct pinpointing terrorists: “They may own homes, live in
communities with families, belong to religious or social
organizations and attend educational institutions.”172 If the NYPD
considers these activities suspicious, then a government
“dragnet” has been realized,173 and the NYPD apparently now
assumes that otherwise lawful actors are suspicious potential
terrorists.174 This suspicion, however, must arise from
something.175 Regrettably, in the current climate it is reasonable
to fear that merely espousing opinions unpopular to those in
power may create suspicion.176
a. The Change in Contemporary Circumstances Does Not
Satisfy the Rufo Analysis
Defendants’ argument that “circumstances have changed” is
similar to those previously offered by the government to defend
172

See Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 9.
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects
against “dragnet techniques”).
174
Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 9.
175
See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 21-25 (1994). Silence on the
factors police use to determine suspicion when they are not required to show
specific information of criminal activity or the threat of criminal activity
recalls the government’s “trust the integrity of the executive” argument. Id.
(discussing the government’s oral argument in United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297).
176
For examples of conduct that the NYPD has deemed suspicious in the
past, see Handschu v. Special Serices Division, 131 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (discussing investigation of civil rights group); People v. Collier, 376
N.Y.S.2d 954, 961-63 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (discussing investigation of community
activist); Murphy Aff., supra note 57 (discussing the police activities that led
to the adoption of the settlement); supra notes 57-58 (same). For examples of
what the Chicago police and the U.S. government consider suspicious, see
Frank Main, Police to Videotape Protesters, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 7,
2002, at 6 (discussing Chicago police surveillance of social justice activists);
Dave Lindorff, Grounded, SALON (Nov. 15, 2002) (discussing the federal
government’s list of people it does not want to fly, which includes peace
activists), at http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2002/11/15/no_fly.html.
173
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suspect executive action.177 For example, in United States v.
United States District Court the government argued that times
were dangerous and thus necessitated government actions to
defend itself.178 The case involved individuals attempting to
review government wiretaps of their conversations to determine
whether their indictments were based on illegally obtained
evidence.179 The government posited that electronic monitoring of
the defendants’ conversations without a warrant was lawful.180
177

See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(forcing discovery of the source of information the U.S. government was
using to charge defendants with conspiracy to, inter alia, illegally sabotage an
Ann Arbor Central Intelligence Agency office). In United States v. United
States District Court, the government had proffered the constitutionally
unsound argument that the President of the United States, acting through the
Attorney General, possessed inherent executive powers to authorize wiretaps
of domestic groups without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 299-300; infra Part
II.B.2 (discussing defendants arguments). See also David Edwards, Unique
Threats, Profitable Responses, MEDIA LENS (2002) (demonstrating that there
was a “unique” threat posed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, by international
terrorism in the 1980s, and by Iraq today), republished in ZNET,
http://www.zmag.org/znet.html (Nov. 6, 2002).
178
407 U.S. at 311-13 (noting that the government was concerned with
“threats and acts of sabotage”). See also KINOY, supra note 175, at 21-25
(describing the arguments raised by the U.S. in the papers and to the Supreme
Court). As reason for supporting a domestic security exemption to the warrant
requirement, the government cited historical laws that reflected fear of
domestic violence and rebellion as well as the Presidential oath of office and
told the Court that it had to rely on the “integrity of the Executive branch.”
Id. at 22, 24. The Handschu defendants’ argument was the same: times are
dangerous, which creates the necessity of unfettered police conduct. See supra
Part II.B (discussing defendant’s requested modifications).
179
United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(ordering the government to make full disclosure to the defendant of
monitored conversations).
180
Id. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had not ruled on the validity
of the government’s position that the government should be able to determine
unilaterally whether a given situation concerned national security, the district
court noted that “[w]e are a country of laws and not of men,” id., and warned:
An idea which seems to permeate much of the [g]overnment’s
argument is that a dissident domestic organization is akin to an
unfriendly foreign power and must be dealt with in the same fashion.
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Justice Powell noted:
History abundantly documents the tendency of
Government—however benevolent and benign its
motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently
dispute its policies. [Constitutional] protections become
the more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in
their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is
acute where the Government attempts to act under so
vague a concept as the power to protect “domestic
security.”181
The argument that times are dangerous should fail now for
the same reasons it failed then.182 Domestic security concerns
were invoked in the 1970s in the same manner that terrorism is
today.183 But citing the specter of terrorism, as with domestic
security, inadequately supports the government’s drastic plea to

There is great danger in an argument of this nature for it strikes at the
very constitutional privileges and immunities that are inherent in . . .
citizenship. It is to be remembered that in our democracy all men are
to receive equal justice regardless of their political beliefs or
persuasions.
Id. at 1079.
181
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 314. For
example, in the years preceding and during World War I, nine hundred people
went to prison under the Espionage Act. See ZINN, supra note 158, at 356-59.
182
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 318-19
(recognizing that the government cannot simply invoke national security to
justify exercising power to, in effect, suspend the constitution whenever it
deems appropriate). The Court also rejected the government’s argument that
the issues were too complex for the judiciary to handle. Id. at 320.
183
Compare id. at 320 (“Security surveillances are especially sensitive
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the
temptation to utilize surveillances to oversee political dissent.”), with
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (acknowledging defendants’ argument that the
restrictions are inconsistent with the public interest because of the threat of
terrorism).
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eviscerate the Handschu Settlement.184 Indeed, “the recurring
desire of reigning officials to employ dragnet techniques to
intimidate their critics lies at the core of . . . [Fourth
Amendment] prohibition[s].”185
It can be argued that dedicating resources to preventing
terrorist attacks is a necessary police action after September 11,
especially in New York.186 Some commentators have advocated
government use of military force where local law enforcement is
overmatched.187 The media bombarded the public in the past year
with suggestions that the intelligence community did not perform
its function to prevent the terrorist attacks of 2001.188 But neither
184

United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 320.
Id. at 327 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas recognized that
“such excesses as the use of general warrants and the writs of assistance . . .
led to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
186
William K. Rashbaum, Kelly Seeking Federal Money for City Police,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at B1 (reporting that police asked the federal
government for funds to allay the cost of the NYPD’s counterterrorism
efforts). The NYPD has approximately one thousand officers devoted to
working on terrorism. Id.
187
David A. Klinger & Dave Grossman, Responses to the September 11
Attacks: Who should Deal with Foreign Terrorists on U.S. Soil?: Socio-Legal
Consequences of September 11 and the Ongoing Threat of Terrorist Attacks in
America, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 815, 823 (2002) (arguing that since
local law enforcement is overmatched in dealing with terrorist threats, perhaps
some consideration should be given to lifting the two hundred year ban on
U.S. military involvement in local law enforcement). Klinger & Grossman
describe an updated and fanciful version of the LAPD shootout with the
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), with a much better armed and trained Al
Qaeda in the SLA’s former role. Id. at 824-25. But see Schmitt & Shenon,
supra note 156 (discussing the comments of an officer who does not consider
the threats against the U.S. to be significant). General Eberhart recognized
that “[o]ur basic freedoms must be protected” and that the country had “to
make sure that we’re not out there doing . . . some of the things we did in the
‘50s with McCarthyism . . . [,] a very sad chapter in our history.” Id.
188
See, e.g., Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable but Insufficient–Federal
Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 1145, 1148 (2002) (commenting that the USA PATRIOT Act itself was
promulgated because of intelligence failures); Allison Mitchell & Todd S.
Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Congress; Lawmakers Seek Inquiry Into
Intelligence Failures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at A1; David E. Sanger,
185
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a perceived need to allocate resources nor the discussion of
intelligence failures justify removing the safeguards of the
Handschu Settlement. Handschu was concerned with government
intrusion on lawful political activity, not legitimate investigations
by local law enforcement of activities that can be shown to be
criminal.189 Considering the settlement provisions, it is difficult to
understand how this seemingly innocuous framework could be
considered to hinder police work.190 In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel
recently described the agreement as not particularly stringent in
terms of what the police are required to show to conduct an
investigation.191
Defendants cannot establish the necessary connection between
lawful political activity and terrorism.192 This is because any

Bush Was Warned Bin Laden Wanted To Hijack Planes, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2002, at A1; Philip Shenon, Traces of Terrorism: The Warnings; F.B.I. Knew
for Years About Terror Pilot Training, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2002, at A1.
189
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1420 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (establishing settlement guidelines for the purpose of regulating
investigations of political activity). Political activity is the “exercise of a right
or expression or association for the purpose of maintaining or changing
governmental policies or social conditions.” Id.
190
See supra Part II.A (discussing settlement provisions).
191
See Perrotta, Police Ask Court to View Secret Papers, supra note 107
(quoting plaintiffs’ counsel as describing the original agreement as a relatively
“low hurdle” because a showing of specific information is a lower threshold
than reasonable suspicion); Chevigny, supra note 6, at 765 n.200 (recognizing
differing views on whether specific information is any different from
reasonable suspicion). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)
(defining reasonable suspicion as requiring an officer to “be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant” an intrusion).
192
See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says
Rewriting of Domestic Spying Restrictions Gives FBI New Powers Despite
Growing Evidence of Analytical Failures (May 30, 2002) (noting that
rewriting the FBI’s guidelines on domestic spying “will do little to make us
safer but will inevitably make us less free”), available at http://www.aclu.org/
NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm; see also Cole, supra note 153, at 9991000 (discussing the role of citizenship in historic assaults on civil liberties).
The government in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 70
F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
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logical connection between the city’s interest in preventing future
attacks and spying on domestic political groups is tenuous as
best.193 Lawful political activity usually has nothing to do with
planning or designing terrorist acts.194 One example from the FBI
Guidelines illustrates a situation where lawful activities might
lead to terrorism suspicion: an urban organization’s attempt to
purchase vast amounts of fertilizer or other combustible agents.195
According to the guidelines, this presumptively raises suspicion
to investigate a particular group.196 The political or religious
nature of this hypothetical group cannot raise suspicion.197
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1998), argued that in order to deport
non-citizens they should only have to show association with and support of a
terrorist group and not that any of the individual’s conduct assisted terrorist
activity. Cole, supra note 153, at 999-1000. The Ninth Circuit, rejecting the
argument, held that the First Amendment protected both citizens and aliens
alike in this regard. Id. Subsequent legislation reversed federal court
jurisdiction over this type of claim by a noncitizen. Id.
193
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, How “Patriot Act 2”
Would Further Erode the Basic Checks on Government Power That Keep
America Safe and Free (Mar. 20, 2003) (establishing the falsity of the claim
that it is necessary to undermine civil liberties in order to effectuate safety),
available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12161&c
=206.
194
See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (explaining that acts of peaceful
civil disobedience are not terrorism). The government’s reply to this
contention would most likely be that some lawful political activity may
develop into planning terrorist acts. The response must be that if this is so,
only strict oversight can ensure a minimum of abuse in investigations.
Moreover, assuming its resources are scarce, the government has an interest in
focusing its investigations where it is most confident they will yield results.
See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, How “Patriot Act 2”
Would Further Erode the Basic Checks on Government Power That Keep
America Safe and Free, supra note 193 (recognizing that scarce resources
should drive investigations to focus on actual potential threats).
195
FBI Guidelines, supra note 136, at 2 (noting that where groups attempt
to acquire toxic chemicals, without apparent reason, an investigation may be
justified).
196
Id.
197
See Cole, supra note 153, at 1003 (noting that using political or
religious affiliations to determine guilt bypasses the procedures that are in
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Rather, the attempted purchase is specific information of criminal
or threatened activity.198 If the mere political nature of a group
raises suspicion, the predictable result is simply that dissenters—
those with unpopular ideas—will be viewed as suspicious.199
Blurring the lines between lawful political activity and
terrorism constitutes an implicit government effort to link actual
terrorists on the one hand and political dissenters on the other.200
Over the past year, government officials have sought to establish
a this link,201 but the link, to the extent that it can be established,
serves only to justify the government’s desire to reinstate
surveillance of activists and dissenters. Political dissent,
however, should be a protected activity any time “our way of
life” is threatened.202 Although political groups unpopular with

place to distinguish the guilty from the innocent).
198
FBI Guidelines, supra note 136, at 2.
199
See Cole, supra note 153, at 994-95 (recognizing that early targets of
government harassment were alien union members that were critical of
capitalism). Cole warns that “[o]nce again, we are treating people as
suspicious not for their conduct, but based on their racial, ethnic, or political
identity.” Id. at 1003.
200
For example, the federal government has a list of people, including
peace activists and civil libertarians, who are subjected to scrutiny and
harassment when they attempt to fly. See Lindorff, supra note 176 (discussing
a alleged government no-fly list). The list was acknowledged by the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration and has resulted in the airport
harassment of a Milwaukee nun heading to a peace conference. Id. This link
has also been implicitly established by other commentators. See Klinger &
Grossman, supra note 188, at 824-25 (analogizing the SLA shootout, which
involved radical government activists, to a hypothetical shootout with Al
Qaeda).
201
D.T. Max, The Making of the Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at
32 (quoting President Bush as saying, “You’re either with us, or with the
terrorists.”).
202
See Bush Speaks of Security, supra note 152. See also Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Appalled by Ashcroft Statement on
Dissent; Calls Free Speech “Main Engine of Justice” (Dec. 10, 2001)
(statement of Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU’s national office in
Washington, D.C., that a lesson from the history of dissent is “that free and
robust debate is one of the main engines of social and political justice. . . .
[D]ebate only strengthens our government [by providing legitimacy to its
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those in power are not necessarily terrorists, given the
opportunity and the cover of legitimacy, government officials
will naturally focus their attention on dissenters.203 But neither
local law enforcement nor societal needs will be met by silencing
dissent, and suppressing these voices will make New York
inhospitable to the lawful activity of groups concerned about
government action.204
The Handschu Settlement was a natural target for exploitation
in a stressful time.205 The police argued that the present situation
is grave and that removing procedural safeguards from their
investigations was a necessary precaution.206 Without more,
however, this argument is unavailing. Justice Douglas noted
more than thirty years ago that “[w]hen the Executive attempts to
excuse these tactics as essential to its defense against internal
subversion, we are obliged to remind it, without apology, of this
Court’s long commitment to the preservation of the Bill of Rights
from the corrosive environment of precisely such expedients.”207
Moreover, a variety of situations can be deemed to create a

actions] in this time of national crisis”), available at http://www.aclu.org/
FreeSpeech.cfm.
203
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314
(1972) (recognizing government tendency to focus on dissenters).
204
This observation is supported by the events that prompted the
Handschu Settlement in the first place. See supra Part II (describing
background events to the settlement). The terms of the settlement reveal that
residents’ interests are better served by limiting law enforcement capacity to
muffle dissent. See supra Part II.A (describing terms of the settlement). See
also Leonard Levitt, No Connection to Intelligence, NEWSDAY, Sept. 30, 2002
at A12 (reporting the motion’s lack of evidence that abrogating the Handschu
Settlement would in any way assist the NYPD in fighting terrorism); Flynn &
Fries, supra note 5 (reporting that police contend modification of Handschu
warranted by change in circumstances).
205
See, e.g., John Barlow Weiner, Note, Institutional Reform Consent
Decrees as Conservers of Social Progress, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
355 (1996).
206
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 13-14. See also Cole, supra
note 153, at 955.
207
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 331 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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heightened sense of national security.208 And, the United States is
constantly conducting military operations against various
countries and enemies.209 Thus, an argument that points to a time
of war or grave danger becomes all-inclusive. Judge Haight
relied almost entirely on the notion that changes to the world are
“perfectly apparent” in his decision to modify the Handschu
Settlement.210 The NYPD is justifiably concerned about the safety
of New Yorkers.211 Nevertheless, the safety of New Yorkers can
be protected without removing the restrictions on police activity
obtained by the Handschu litigants.212 Safety of residents and
citizenry depends as much on the free and open exchange of ideas
as it does on physical protection.213 Removing procedural

208

See, e.g., Zoltan Grossman, From Wounded Knee to Afghanistan: A
Century of US Military Interventions, ZNET, at http://www.zmag.org/list2.
htm (Oct. 8, 2001) (demonstrating, even with an incomplete list, that there has
been virtually unceasing U.S. military activities since 1890). See also Noam
Chomsky, Terror and Just Response, ZNET, at http://www.zmag.org/znet/htm
(Aug. 1, 2002) (itemizing U.S. military operations, including the war against
Nicaragua, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and the bombing of the Sudan in
1998, and those of its clients and allies, that when applying a noncontroversial definition of terrorism, qualify as terrorism).
209
Grossman, supra note 208.
210
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003).
211
NYPD Mission Statement, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
nypd/html/mission.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). “The Mission of the New
York City Police Department is to enhance the quality of life in our City by
working in partnership with the community and in accordance with
constitutional rights to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and
provide for a safe environment.” Id.
212
See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2000) (arguing that American foreign
policy activities that hurt people worldwide make terrorist attacks predictable
and that some changes in foreign policy would likely result in reducing the
threat of terrorism); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the terms of the
settlement).
213
See, e.g., United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing at the outset of proceedings against an alleged
terrorist group in Buffalo, New York, that constitutional protections and
concepts of American democracy provide “sufficient strength and protection to
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safeguards in government surveillance techniques cannot be
proven to lead to an increase in security.214
b. Seeking the Constitutional Floor
Defendants’ modification maintained the existence of the
Authority.215 Arguably, the Authority was maintained solely for
the purpose of not violating the Rufo requirement that any
modification not seek the constitutional floor.216 But its mere
existence does not necessarily keep the defendants above the
constitutional floor.217 Indeed, a strong argument exists that the
Handschu defendants, beyond just seeking the constitutional
bring citizens to justice without weakening our security”); Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union, Threats to Civil Liberties Post-September 11:
Secrecy, Erosion of Privacy, Danger of Unchecked Government (Dec. 14,
2001) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, associate director of the ACLU’s
national office in Washington, D.C., noting that American democracy is “a
political system based on the ideas of transparency and accountability”),
available at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=
9857&c=24.
214
See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU
Appalled by Ashcroft Statement, supra note 204 (disagreeing with the
Attorney General that “domestic debate about the government response in any
way harms the investigation”); see also Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Says Rewriting of Domestic Spying Restrictions
Gives FBI New Powers, supra note 193 (recognizing that the FBI Guidelines,
which provide for investigation upon a showing of a law enforcement purpose,
will allow the government to gather even more of information it has shown it
has difficulty analyzing).
215
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing modifications of the Handschu
Settlement and the role of the Authority after modification). See also
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, *50-51
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (considering the existence of the Authority and the
incorporation of the FBI Guidelines into the patrol guide as sufficient to keep
defendants above the constitutional floor).
216
See supra Part I (discussing the requirements of consent decree
modification).
217
See supra Part I (discussing the requirements of consent decree
modification). It further allows them to suggest that they are not perpetuating a
constitutional violation. See supra Part I (discussing the requirements of
consent decree modification).
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floor, actually risked creating or perpetuating a constitutional
violation.218
Citing Laird v. Tatum,219 which agreed with the government
that the United States Army’s program of domestic surveillance
was not, in itself, a harm that could be redressed, the Handschu
defendants claimed that the existence of a domestic surveillance
program alone is not redressable harm.220 This proposition,
however, was qualified by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Meese v. Keene,221 which held that government harm to a
plaintiff’s reputation is cognizable.222 Consequently, courts are
willing to review the constitutionality of government surveillance
that harms an individual’s reputation or opportunity for
employment.223 Thus, Handschu cannot be minimized by

218

502 U.S. 367, 391 (1992). Staying above the constitutional floor
means respecting the rights guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments
but not providing any additional safeguards not mandated by the Constitution.
See supra notes 120-37 (discussing the district court analysis of whether
modification impermissibly sought the constitutional floor). If, without the
oversight of the settlement, the NYPD returns to its past practices of
investigating dissenters and minorities without suspicion of crime, the police
run the risk of First and Fourth Amendment violations.
219
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that the claim was barred
as not justiciable and that military surveillance of the civilian population ought
to be reviewed by the legislature).
220
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 18.
221
481 U.S. 465, 472 (1987) (holding that government harm to a
plaintiffs reputation is cognizable). A California State Senator wanted to
exhibit Canadian films. Id. at 467. The films had been labeled “political
propaganda” pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22
U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1966), and the state senator contended that he was deterred
from showing the films because it would have had a negative impact on his
reputation. Id. at 473. The Court held that the state senator had standing
because he had demonstrated that a government action—labeling the films
propaganda—could have caused him a direct injury, distinct and palpable. Id.
The Court ultimately held that the statute did not actually violate the state
senator’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 484.
222
Id. at 472.
223
See, e.g., id.; Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 585-86
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff class of lawyers, political activists
and political organizations had standing to sue police for unconstitutional
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reference to Laird.224
Moreover, the defendants disingenuously disregarded the
benefits that accrued to them when they claimed that no
cognizable harm was established in Handschu.225 The litigants
agreed to the consent order thereby avoiding long, drawn out
litigation226 and, arguably, unflattering exposure of police
misconduct. Furthermore, in addition to the harm caused by the
chilling effect on the exercise of their constitutional rights, the
Handschu plaintiffs also had argued that police use of informers,
among other techniques, would have constituted harm.227 The
absence of a conclusive judicial finding of harm does not prove a
total absence of harm; settlement was simply an effective and
expeditious means to end the litigation.228
c. Compilation/Exchange of Data and Information Sharing
The NYPD also complained that prohibiting collection of
publicly available information “compel[led] the NYPD to

surveillance and maintenance of files since plaintiffs alleged that they were
actual targets of the surveillance and the conduct of the police caused harm to
their reputations).
224
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (recognizing that because the plaintiffs alleged a specific instance where
the police conduct curtailed their exercise of First Amendment rights, the case
was brought “beyond the pale” of Laird v. Tatum).
225
See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 18. The defendants cite
Laird v. Tatum for the proposition that “the Constitution does not constrain
government from collecting, retaining, and sharing information regarding
lawful activity.” Id.
226
Anderson, supra note 11, at 726 (explaining that “[s]ettlement through
consent decrees holds numerous advantages over protracted litigation.
Settlement avoids the time, expense and risk of trial”). See also Handschu v.
Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (recognizing
that settling the litigation provided defendants the opportunity to reduce the
publicity surrounding their actions that allegedly harmed plaintiffs).
227
See Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 768 (itemizing categories of harm from
police action).
228
See supra Part I.A (discussing the use of consent decrees in reform
litigation).
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virtually close its eyes to that which everyone but police officers
can see, record, and reflect upon.”229 According to the
defendants, the police must sit on their hands at public events
while “[t]errorists take advantage of this lopsided state of affairs
and safely use political events to advance their terrorist
purposes.”230 Yet, defendants did not and presumably could not
explain how “terrorist operatives” would use public events to
further an illegal purpose.231 Moreover, the Handschu Settlement
neither required the NYPD to ignore public information, as
defendants stated,232 nor barred police attendance at public
events.233
Defendants also argued that the restriction on sharing
information with other agencies made it impossible for the NYPD
to participate in the international effort to fight terrorism.234 They
claimed that the settlement affected a necessary partnership of
local, state and federal law enforcement.235 If, however, another
law enforcement agency requests information on a particular
individual or group, the Handschu Settlement does nothing to
prevent police from providing it.236 On the contrary, the plain
229

Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 14 (referring to the Handschu
Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.A).
230
Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 16.
231
See Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 7-8. Deputy Commissioner
Cohen does note that a confiscated terrorism manual teaches would-be
terrorists to “attend public meetings to learn about major decisions and topics
being discussed . . . to follow news[,] to keep track of tourist activity and
arrival times of foreign tourist groups . . . and to note advertisements about
new and used car lots which may be used in assassination, kidnapping, and
overthrowing the government.” Id.
232
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.A (prohibiting maintenance
of public information with the intelligence unit of the NYPD). The settlement
does not require ignoring information from publicly available sources. Id.
233
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § IV.B (allowing for police
inquiry into a planned public event).
234
See Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 17-22 (noting that there are
practical difficulties of forcing other agencies to comply with Handschu and
asserting that the police have to be empowered to work with other agencies).
235
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 16-17.
236
Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VII.A (requiring the other law
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language of the settlement allows the sharing of information.237 It
is also interesting to note that, until recently, the partnership the
defendants appear to crave seemed to be moving in the opposite
direction. For example, congressional legislation authorizes the
federal government to sue local law enforcement for patterns and
practices resulting in civil rights violations.238 The Department of
Justice could include a pattern or practice of illegal and intrusive
police surveillance and infiltration as a cognizable claim.239
enforcement entity or government agency to adhere to provisions on
maintenance of information).
237
See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent
Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579,
632 (concluding that interpretation of contested language of consent orders
ought to be accomplished by looking to the “grievance the decree was
designed to cure”). This argument does not attempt to ascertain what is meant
by “law enforcement agencies or government agencies conducting security
clearance procedures” in section VII.A of the settlement and will assume the
statement can be fairly read that other government and law enforcement
agencies can legitimately obtain information collected by the NYPD pursuant
to the settlement.
238
42 U.S.C. § 14,141 (1994).
It shall be unlawful conduct for any governmental authority, or any
agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental
authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law
enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Id. For detailed discussions of the potential use of § 14,141 to curb unlawful
police activities, see Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of
Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 815 (1999)
(discussing the possibility of consent decrees in the cities of Pittsburgh, Pa.,
and Steubenville, Ohio, to enjoin police abuses); Marshall Miller, Police
Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (1998) (studying the legislative
intent of the statute, how it can be used and what the Department of Justice
would have to show to establish the pattern or practice and anticipating how
the courts will react to suits based on alleged violations). But see Schlanger,
supra note 13, at 2022 (pointing out that, given its history in prison reform
litigation, the Department of Justice is hardly to be trusted to act as
“trailblazer” for reform suits).
239
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472 (1987) (recognizing that harm to
a plaintiff’s reputation is an action of government that causes direct injury,
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Unfortunately, current Department of Justice sentiments may
limit this possibility.240
Defendants correctly noted that the USA PATRIOT Act urges
government agencies to share information.241 But, the sections of
the USA PATRIOT Act cited by defendants largely encourage
only further sharing of information gathered and shared under
federal law in place before Handschu was settled.242 Thus, the
distinct and palpable, and is thus cognizable). Therefore, if police surveillance
and infiltration causes a direct injury and a pattern and practice can be
established, the Department of Justice could succeed in a suit against a local
police department. See also Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 58586 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff class of lawyers, political activists,
and political organizations had standing to sue police for unconstitutional
surveillance and maintenance of files since plaintiffs alleged that they were
actual targets of the surveillance and the conduct of the police caused harm to
their reputations); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1248
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (dismissing for lack of standing a suit brought by federal
government to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional activities of the
Philadelphia Police Department). The government’s standing problem in City
of Philadelphia seems to have been cured by 42 U.SC. § 14,141. See
Livingston, supra note 241, at 815 (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 14,141
authorizes Department of Justice to sue police departments).
240
See, e.g., Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy Before the Senate Jud.
Comm., 106th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft,
stating, inter alia, that the Department of Justice was going to shift its focus
from enforcing the nation’s laws to becoming an anti-terrorism outfit). See
also Miller, supra note 238, at 178 (noting that because individuals do not
have standing to sue under § 14,141, it will be incumbent on the Department
of Justice to bring suit).
241
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, at § 701 (2001) (USA PATRIOT Act) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code) (expanding information sharing to facilitate federal-state-local law
enforcement response related to terrorism). See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra
note 5, at 16-17, citing USA PATRIOT Act § 701.
242
Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 17 (citing USA PATRIOT Act
sections 701, 314). Section 701 amended a portion of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3796h (2003), by adding
the words “terrorist conspiracies and activities” to a statute that authorized
grant and contract making by the federal government with state and local law
enforcement to share information related to crime. USA PATRIOT Act § 701.
Section 314 encourages further cooperation among financial institutions, law
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USA PATRIOT Act may not comprise a necessary change in law
under Rufo.243 Because the law has not changed from the time of
the settlement, the NYPD cannot successfully argue that the USA
PATRIOT Act provisions permit modification.244

enforcement and others, revising the 1970 and 1982 enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5311
(2003), which required sharing of information by financial institutions, law
enforcement and regulatory agencies to facilitate criminal investigations. §
5311. The argument that the USA PATRIOT Act’s express extension of the
application of information sharing laws to terrorism investigations has only a
slight practical effect on activities of law enforcement entities is a narrow one.
Because of the ambiguities surrounding the definition of “terrorism,” it is
difficult to see what more these new provisions do besides increase the
possibility of abusive police practices. This note does not comment on the
reach of the USA PATRIOT Act’s other provisions or on the cumulative
radical effect of the Act in conjunction with other recent positions adopted by
the government. For an examination of the cumulative effect, see Chisun Lee,
Bracing for Bush’s War at Home, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 26-Apr. 1, 2003, at
56 (looking at recent government activity including the USA PATRIOT Act,
the proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act, and treatment of prisoners
in the war on terror, that, taken together, paint a terrifying picture of the
future of American liberty and democracy).
243
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 390 (1992)
(acknowledging that a change in the law may require modification); see also
Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S.
642, 649 (1961) (recognizing a change in the law when congressional
legislation was passed, authorizing union shops before such union shops were
prohibited).
244
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390. It is true, as defendants noted, that the other
entities must agree to the same restrictions in their management of the
information. See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 16-17. But this should
not be problematic for governmental agencies which routinely manage vast
amounts of information. But see Ann Davis, FBI’s Post-Sept. 11 ‘Watch List’
Mutates, Acquires Life of Its Own, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2002, at A1
(discussing the FBI list of people considered to be threats to the U.S. that was
disseminated to the corporate world after September 11 and now is “lost”).
The loss of the information and the subsequent problems are certainly
regrettable. It could be argued, however, that a governmental inability to
effectively share information due to bureaucratic inefficiency or fights over
turf are a final safeguard against intrusions by government into our lives.
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B. Potential Deleterious Results of Modifying Handschu
Recent modification of a similar 1982 Chicago consent decree
aptly illustrates the potential effects of modifying Handschu.245
The settlement arising from Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago was recently modified.246 As in Handschu, the Chicago

245

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537
(N.D. Ill. 1982). The plaintiffs from Alliance were a class of Chicago
residents that:
engaged in lawful, political, religious, educational or social activities
and who, as a result of these activities, have been . . . subjected to or
threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion,
photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary
punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and
dissemination.
Alliance, 561 F. Supp. at 540. The defendants conducting the activities
regulated by the Chicago Settlement were the Chicago Police, the FBI, CIA
and the Department of Defense. Id. The Chicago Settlement created
restrictions on investigations of political actors, including prohibition on
investigations that were solely based on protected First and Fourth
Amendment activities. Id. at 560. The settlement also required periodic audits
by independent public accounting firms. Id. at 568-69.
246
237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001) (deciding that the with the Red
Squads gone there was support to modify the settlement). This decision, from
January 2001, reflected the Chicago police’s belief that the era of harassment
of political actors, which stretched from the 1920s to the 1970s, had come to
an end. Id. at 801. The court noted that the “core” of the decree, which
forbade “investigations intended to interfere with or deter the exercise of the
freedom of expression that the First Amendment protects, and requires . . .
periodic audits,” remained, but “periphery” restrictions would be lifted. Id. at
800. What Judge Posner considered the periphery of the decree, however,
included the requirement of reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity.
Id. The Handschu Settlement and the Chicago Settlement have some minor
differences. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (recognizing a difference
for the purpose of a modification seeking the constitutional floor, that the
Chicago Settlement requires periodic independent audits); see also Chevigny,
supra note 6, at 760-63. Judge Posner’s assertion that “advocacy of violence”
does not raise a reasonable suspicion does not reflect the reality of the Chicago
Settlement. Alliance, 561 F. Supp. at 563, 565 (establishing settlement and
reasonable suspicion as showing Chicago police and the FBI have to make).
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police argued that circumstances had changed to allow the
modification of the settlement.247 In his decision granting
modification, Judge Posner cited no actual changes that would
warrant the modification, and argued simply:
Today the concern, prudent and not paranoid, is with
ideologically motivated terrorism. The City does not want
to resurrect the Red Squad. It wants to be able to keep
tabs on incipient terrorist groups. New groups of political
extremists, believers in and advocates of violence, form
daily around the world. If one forms in or migrates to
Chicago, the decree renders the police helpless to do
anything to protect the public against the day when the
group decides to commit a terrorist act. Until the group
goes beyond the advocacy of violence and begins
preparatory actions that might create reasonable suspicion
of imminent criminal activity, the hands of police are tied.
And if the police have been forbidden to investigate until
then, if the investigation cannot begin until the group is
well on its way toward the commission of terrorist acts,
the investigation may come too late to prevent the acts or
to identify the perpetrators.248
The Chicago police, perhaps in addition to the work fighting
terrorism, recently initiated a new project.249 Under their renewed
The police under that settlement were rightly allowed to begin an investigation
if they became aware of credible advocacy of violence. Id.
247
Compare Alliance, 237 F.3d at 802 (noting a difference between
circumstances surrounding the police harassment of political dissenters and
current police action to deal with terrorism), with Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2134, at *27-28 (accepting defendants’ argument that the world was
different after September 11).
248
Alliance, 237 F.3d at 802. See also H.C. 5100/94, Public Committee
Against Torture v. State of Israel, reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH AND
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 827 (7th ed. 2001) (disposing, by the Supreme Court of the State
of Israel, of an argument made by the Israeli government that the world is
dangerous and that the “ticking time bomb” requires torture).
249
See Main, supra note 176, at 6 (reporting that “anti-globalization”
protesters in Chicago for a business conference would be taped, their photos
saved to prepare for future protests, and their meetings infiltrated by police).
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license to investigate lawful political activity, the Chicago police
have targeted peace and social justice demonstrators.250 This
indicates how the proposed modifications of the Handschu
Settlement will likely be used in New York City.251
250

Id.; see also Paul Street, Empire Abroad, Repression at Home: Notes
From Chicago, ZNET, http://www.zmag.org/znet.html (Nov. 8, 2002)
(criticizing as hypocritical comments by the CEO of Boeing Corporation, a
leading manufacturer of weapons, expressing his concern about the possibility
of violence at protests of the business conference).
251
At least one commentator has noted that police forces across the nation
began re-instituting long-condemned practices prior to September 11. Abby
Scher, The Crackdown on Dissent, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 23
(discussing police targeting of activists and demonstrators throughout 2000,
including at the major political party conventions in Philadelphia and Los
Angeles). The police rounded up hundreds of activists in “preemptive” arrests
in Philadelphia, although charges against them were dismissed when police
could offer no reason for the arrests. Id. Scher noted overt police surveillance
of the type restricted by Handschu as well as “police raids of demonstrators’
gathering spaces . . . [, f]alse stories to the press . . . [, r]ounding up
demonstrators on trumped-up charges . . . [, l]ist making . . . [, p]olitical
profiling . . . [, u]nconstitutional bail amounts . . . [and b]rutal treatment.” Id.
On the other hand, the use of police “debriefings” after the arrests of
protesters and demonstrators has supposedly been curtailed. See William K.
Rashbaum, Police Stop Collecting Data on Protesters’ Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2003, at D1 (noting the practice, which had begun in February with
the use of the “Demonstration Debriefing Form,” information from which had
been loaded into a database, would end and the database destroyed). Civil
liberties lawyers noted that calling these un-counseled interrogations
“debriefings” did not remove them from the ambit of constitutional
protections. Id. The police would not comment on the debriefing’s
constitutionality but denied the separate contention that asking protesters what
school they were from, what prior protests they had attended and their
involvement in any organizations, violated either Handschu or the modified
Handschu Settlement. Id. In response to this questioning, the Handschu
plaintiffs moved (too late for consideration in this note) to incorporate the FBI
Guidelines into the decree itself. See Tom Perrotta, Attorneys Seek to Codify
Rule Against Police Questioning of Political Beliefs, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 2003,
at 1 (noting plaintiffs’ motion seeking to make the FBI Guidelines part of the
decree was a response to the demonstrated “aim” of the NYPD’s modification
motion: to harass dissenters). The modification order required that the NYPD
include the FBI Guidelines in the patrol guide, but this created no enforceable
rights. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3643, at
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CONCLUSION
New York City residents and the NYPD share a profound
interest in deterring terrorist attacks on the city.252 Residents and
citizens, however, also have an interest in protecting individual
liberties in the face of government action and ensuring that
government agents do not violate constitutional rights in the
exercise of their authority.253 The current climate has heightened
the interests of both parties. To understand why the police
wanted to remove the Handschu safeguards, and the connection
between Handschu and the current climate, the lessons of history
must also be considered.254 Those lessons demonstrate that
consolidation of government power and intimidation of dissenters
is predictable in times of societal stress.255 When government
*11-12 (allowing the FBI ‘Reservation’ to be included in the patrol guide);
supra Part II.B.2 (describing the court’s decision to modify). The reservation
section makes clear that the FBI Guidelines are not part of the decree itself:
These guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal
NYPD guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor
do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and
litigative prerogatives of the NYPD or the City of New York.
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3643, at *11-12.
Thus the plaintiffs’ motion, if successful, would elevate the FBI
Guidelines to a requirement imposed upon the police and enforceable through
the court. See William K. Rashbaum, Civil Rights Lawyers Seek Teeth For
Rules on Police Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at D3 (reporting
that the plaintiffs are asking for a revision to the new Handschu guidelines that
will allow for contempt proceedings against the NYPD if it violates the
substance of the FBI Guidelines).
252
See supra Part II.A (discussing reasons for defendant’s motion).
253
The government shares this interest with citizens in that it needs to be
perceived as legitimate. Government is seen as legitimate when it acts
lawfully.
254
See supra Part III.A-B (discussing predictable targeting of dissenters in
stressful times).
255
See supra Part III.A-B. Its ability to be successful in such measures
may be based at least in part on how our fundamental freedoms are protected
in other times. Id.
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agencies argue that the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism
requires the removal of restrictions on police, such arguments
must be met with skepticism.256 The NYPD did not, and cannot,
show that harassing dissenters reduces the threat of terrorism.257
The worthy goal of preventing terrorist attacks is not furthered
by removing safeguards to civil liberties. There was good sense
in requiring the NYPD to establish criminal activities of political
actors and obtain approval prior to investigating those political
actors.258 The Handschu Settlement provided some assurance that
the war on terrorism would not become a pretext for the NYPD
to return to its past transgressions or further other illegitimate
government ends. The settlement existed to ensure that police
investigations do not trample on the rights of New Yorkers.

256

See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (discussing actions
taken by Chicago police after similar restrictions were lifted on that city’s
police force).
257
See supra Part III (discussing defendant’s arguments for modifications
and the court’s reason for granting modification).
258
See supra Part II.A (discussing abusive government behaviors that
provided the backdrop to the settlement).

